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Abstract
This article, based on the analysis of scientific views of scholars, summarizes the foreign experience of control 
over the activity of courts (judges). After summarizing the experience of Germany, it is stated that the legal 
mechanism of control over judges in this country is characterized not only by the differentiation of the distri-
bution of supervisory powers at the federal and regional levels, but also by the active involvement of executive 
and legislative bodies. It is established that the existing foreign experience of control and supervision over the 
work of judges is quite diverse and can be used by domestic legislators when introducing amendments and 
additions to current legislation. The most positive experience that can be used in Ukraine to improve the control 
over the activity of judges includes: 1) The need to improve the procedure for selecting judges; 2) extension of 
the statute of limitations for committing an offense as a ground for disciplinary liability, in order to reduce the 
risk of judges avoiding its occurrence; 3) introduction of new forms and methods of control in the relevant field; 
4) improvement of organizational and legal bases of public involvement in the implementation of control and 
supervision measures in the area under study.
Keywords: Control, courts, foreign experience, judges, legislation, normative legal act.
Resumen
Este artículo, con base en el análisis de opiniones científicas de los académicos, resume la experiencia extran-
jera de control de la actividad de los tribunales (jueces). Tras resumir la experiencia de Alemania, se afirma 
que el mecanismo jurídico de control sobre los jueces en este país se caracteriza no solo por la diferenciación 
de la distribución de las facultades de supervisión a nivel federal y regional, sino también por la participación 
activa de los órganos ejecutivos y legislativos. Se establece que la experiencia extranjera existente en materia 
de control y supervisión de la labor de los jueces es muy diversa y puede ser utilizada por los legisladores 
nacionales al introducir enmiendas y adiciones a la legislación vigente. La experiencia más positiva que puede 
utilizarse en Ucrania para mejorar el control de la actividad de los jueces incluye: 1) la necesidad de mejorar 
el procedimiento de selección de los jueces; 2) la ampliación del plazo de prescripción de la comisión de una 
infracción como motivo de responsabilidad disciplinaria, a fin de reducir el riesgo de que los jueces eviten que 
se produzca; 3) la introducción de nuevas formas y métodos de control en el campo pertinente; 4) la mejora 
de las bases organizativas y jurídicas de la participación pública en la aplicación de medidas de control y 
supervisión en el área objeto de estudio.
Palabras clave: control, tribunales, experiencia extranjera, jueces, legislación, acto normativo legal. 
Resumo
Este artigo, com base na análise de visões científicas de estudiosos, resume a experiência estrangeira de 
controle sobre a atividade dos tribunais (juízes). Após resumir a experiência da Alemanha, afirma-se que o 
mecanismo jurídico de controle dos juízes neste país se caracteriza não só pela diferenciação da distribuição 
dos poderes de fiscalização nos níveis federal e regional, mas também pelo envolvimento ativo do Executivo e 
órgãos legislativos. Está estabelecido que a experiência estrangeira existente de controle e supervisão sobre 
o trabalho de juízes é bastante diversa e pode ser usada por legisladores nacionais ao introduzir emendas e 
adições à legislação em vigor. A experiência mais positiva que pode ser usada na Ucrânia para melhorar o con-
trole sobre a atividade dos juízes inclui: 1) A necessidade de melhorar o procedimento de seleção dos juízes; 
2) extensão do prazo de prescrição para a prática de crime como fundamento de responsabilidade disciplinar, 
de forma a reduzir o risco de os juízes evitarem a sua ocorrência; 3) introdução de novas formas e métodos 
de controle no campo relevante; 4) melhoria das bases organizacionais e jurídicas do envolvimento público na 
implementação de medidas de controlo e fiscalização na área em estudo.
Palavras-chave: Controle, tribunais, experiência estrangeira, juízes, legislação, ato jurídico normativo.
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I. Introduction
With the adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Constitution of 
Ukraine (Regarding Justice)” and with the new version of the Law of Ukraine “On the 
Judiciary and the Status of Judges” in 2016, a new stage of judicial reform has be-
gun. However, the new version of the said law and the implementation of appropriate 
changes in the organization of the judiciary did not solve all the problems that existed, 
and in some areas of the judiciary it even created new ones. In particular, the main 
ones are: The lack of the necessary level of qualification of judges, starting from the 
stage of selection of candidates for the position of judges and ending with advanced 
training of judges; mainly declarative nature of socio-economic, organizational, moral 
and ethical and other legal guarantees to ensure the service by judges in Ukraine; lack 
of effective control and supervision over the service of judges in Ukraine, etc. In the 
context of the latter, it should be emphasized that today there is no systematic analy-
sis and mechanism for using the positive foreign experience of service by judges. We 
are convinced that the study of foreign experience will allow not only to compare the 
national legal system with foreign counterparts, but also to determine the existence 
of truly effective legal norms suitable for implementation (in the short or long-term 
perspective) in the domestic legal field.
2. Study analysis and problem statement 
A comprehensive study of the international and foreign experience of control over 
the activity of courts (judges) is of great theoretical and practical significance. Such 
scholars as V. A. Kerymov, M. I. Kozyubra, V. O. Kotyuk, V. V. Koshchinets, L. A. Luts, 
B.  V.  Malyshev, M.  M.  Marchenko, M.  I.  Melnyk, N.  M.  Onishchenko, I.  V.  Nazarov, 
V.  T.  Nor, N.  M.  Parkhomeko, A.  H.  Saidov, A.  O.  Selivanov, J.  P.  Shvydenko, 
D. Yu. Khoroshkovska, S. V. Shevchuk, V. I. Yamkovskyi and others considered some 
problematic aspects related to the supervision and control over the activities of judg-
es. However, despite the significant scientific achievements on this issue, there are 
still several problems in this area, the solution of which should be preceded by a study 
of the most positive foreign experience.
The purpose of the article is to generalize foreign experience of supervision and 
control over the activities of judges, as well as to determine the possibility of its use 
in Ukraine.
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3. Research results
Identifying the problems of the legal mechanism of control over courts and judges 
in Ukraine helps the introduction of European standards of control over judges in the 
judicial reform of 2016 (including the principle of quantitative advantage in the per-
sonnel of control entities with key functions of appointment and dismissal of judges 
— judicial authorities, exclusion from the administrative competence of the executive 
and legislative authorities of the power to dismiss courts), and until the expectations 
are met, the court continues to be dependent on political and administrative factors. 
At the same time, several norms that were once criticized by European partners are 
currently almost the only examples of a positive transformation of the judiciary.
Thus, in paragraph 75 of the conclusion of the Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (osce) on the current law “On the Judiciary and the Status of 
Judges” in Ukraine, it was noted that in accordance with international standards, in 
order to protect the independence of the judiciary, individual evaluation should be 
carried out primarily by judges, which will protect the procedure from external, alleg-
edly improper, influence. In Ukraine, judges are evaluated by the High Qualifications 
Commission of Judges with assistance from the Public Integrity Council. If the pow-
ers of the Public Council are beyond the scope of powers of a purely advisory body 
and even allow the Public Council to significantly influence the evaluation results by, 
in fact, vetoing a positive assessment of a certain judge by the High Qualifications 
Commission of Judges, this means that the evaluation procedure is no longer entirely 
within the competence of the judicial self-government body. Therefore, it is desirable 
to review these additional powers of the Public Council of Integrity and, ideally, to 
abandon them1. Instead, practice shows that the active work of the Public Integrity 
Council is the main factor in clearing the judiciary of dishonest, unprofessional judges. 
At the same time, members of the judiciary, in fact sabotaging cooperation with public 
institutions, are quite monolithic in this endeavor — regardless of whether they are 
elected by the quota of the judiciary or by representatives of other branches of govern-
ment, third parties.
Turning directly to the analysis of the experience of specific European countries, 
we must first pay attention to the United Kingdom. The peculiarity of the British judi-
ciary is that it consists of three judicial systems — England and Wales, Scotland and 
1 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (osce). Conclusion of the osce 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights No. jud-ukr/298/2017 [rju/at] 
of 30 June 2017 on the Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges”. 
(2020). [Electronic resource]. Available at: https://hcj.gov.ua/sites/default/files/
no_3534_en.doc 
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Northern Ireland. All of them should be united by the recently established Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom, which is the highest court and has the power to review 
some of their decisions on legal issues on appeal2. An important preventive measure 
in England is the selection for the position of a judge. Thus, a candidate for the position 
of a judge must pass a triple selection. First of all, you must be a member of one of the 
professional corporations of barristers, solicitors. To be considered a lawyer in the uk, 
you must pass seven modules, which are the basis of legal knowledge. After that, the 
student receives a Bachelor’s degree in Law. Then you need to take a course in legal 
practice, after which you can get a qualification of a lawyer or barrister3. And only from 
one of these positions you can apply for the position of a judge.
It should be noted that, traditionally, the basis for supervision and control is a 
complaint about the work of judges. Control measures in England and Wales are cur-
rently being processed by the new Bureau of Judicial Complaints, which is account-
able to both the Lord Chief Justice (the highest judicial office in England and Wales) 
and the Lord Chancellor. The final decision is made by the Lord Chief Justice and the 
Lord Chancellor. If a judge requests a review, a panel of four people is formed, two 
of whom are judges and two are jurors (who are elected on a schedule from a panel 
of 20 people, who in turn are elected by open competition). The Lord Chief Justice 
and the Lord Chancellor may not impose a harsher punishment than the punishment 
recommended by the Review Panel. If the senior judge is to be dismissed, then the 
Lord Chancellor makes a proposal for his dismissal to both Houses of Parliament, with 
a subsequent referral to the Queen in case of support. In the case of low-level judges, 
the Lord Chancellor dismisses them personally4. 
Summarizing the review of the legal mechanism of control over judges in the uk 
(the system in Scotland and Wales is mainly similar to the analyzed example of England 
and Wales), we note not only a significant limitation of other branches of government 
in the implementation of control over judges, but also the possibility of substantial 
judicial reform, which will reformat the previous millennial traditions of state building 
and functioning of the court in the direction of modern democratic tendencies. 
2 I. V. Nazarov. The judicial system of Great Britain and its reform in connection with the 
membership in the European Union. Problems of legality: a collection of scientific 
works. Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University. (2011). Pg. 179-187, 180.
3 V. V. Koshchinets & J. P. Shvedenko. Some aspects of qualification training of judg-
es (from the experience of foreign countries). bulletin of the state judicial 
administration of ukraine 4. 2012. Pg. 59-68, 61-62.
4 Henry Brooke. english justice system. lord slynn’s euroPean law foundation. 
(2014). [Electronic resource]. Available at: https: //slynn-foundation.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/07/The-English-system-of-justice-Ukrainian-judiciary-seminars-
Ukrainian-version.pdf
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The next European country we will pay attention to is Germany. A judge in 
Germany plays a very active role in resolving a dispute. They are empowered to ques-
tion witnesses, examine evidence, and draw the attention of the parties and their weak 
and strong arguments to the confirmation or denial of the merits of the claims. The 
judge also has the right to refer to a potentially possible resolution of the dispute by in-
viting the parties to reach an agreement through mediation before the trial, or an ami-
cable settlement (Vergleich) throughout the trial period. As a general rule, the trial itself 
lasts one court session, which is the main one (Haupttermin). According to Judge Dr. 
Patrick M. Bomeke, the primary task of a judge in Germany is to become an assistant 
in finding a compromise between the parties. According to him, 1/3 of the cases end 
with the amicable settlement (Vergleich). This is a decision that consists of three parts, 
including an agreement on the payment of funds (division of obligations), division of 
court costs and execution of the agreement. The German judicial system encourages 
the resolution of disputes by concluding amicable agreements, and in particular the 
Code of Civil Procedure provides for the return of 2/3 of the amount of court fees in 
the event of resolution of the case by concluding an amicable agreement5.
In real life Germany, the courts play an important role in interpreting legal norms, 
sources of their origin and development; and in participating in law enforcement and, 
in fact, in the law-making activities of the state6. At the same time, most of the refer-
ences in court decisions are made to the precedents of the court itself, which makes 
an appropriate decision, and to the decisions of the Constitutional Court. Moreover, 
the precedents set by the courts in the application of the law are also binding on 
lawyers and other persons providing legal assistance, since German law provides for 
the civil liability of lawyers for damages to a client, in particular if the lawyer has shown 
incompetence in the knowledge of judicial precedents of higher courts7.
Taking into account the importance of the courts, considerable attention is paid 
to supervision and control over their work in Germany. The federal system of Germany 
provides for different control procedures, depending on the federal or regional level 
of the relevant court. The Basic Law of the country (Articles 94-96, 98) enshrines 
the rules that dictate that members of the Constitutional Federal Court (12 persons) 
are elected in equal proportions by the Bundesrat (upper house of parliament) and 
the Bundestag (lower house of parliament). Other federal courts (Supreme, Social, 
5 N. Tuzhely. euroPean exPerience (on sPecialization and decentralization of 
the judicial system in germany). (2015). [Electronic resource]. Available at: https://
yur-gazeta.com/publications/practice/inshe/evropeyskiy-dosvid.html
6 M. N. Marchenko. sources of law. Prospekt. (2005). Pg. 510.
7 Stanislav V. Shevchuk. judicial law-making: world exPerience and ProsPects in 
ukraine. Referat. (2007). Pg. 395-398.
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Administrative, Financial, Labor) are elected by a decision of the Federal Minister of 
Justice or another sectoral minister approved by the Judicial Selection Commission 
(consisting of the Ministers of Justice of the federation and the same number of 
people elected by the Bundestag). If a federal judge violates the requirements of the 
Constitution or encroaches on the constitutional order of a particular region during 
the performance of his or her official duties, the Federal Constitutional Court may, 
by a qualified majority (2/3 of the composition), decide to transfer the guilty person 
to another position, to retire, or, in the case of intentional wrongful conduct, dismiss8. 
In terms of administrative impact on the court, German experts note the party 
political “excessive control” over the appointment of judges to the main courts of the 
country. According to the political schedules at the land and federal levels, in fact, 
everything is decided by Germany’s ruling Christian Democratic and Christian Social 
Union (cdu/csu) and by the Social Democratic Party of Germany (spd). Each year, the 
issue of several appointments to five federal judges arises, so the two leading parties 
usually discuss “staffing packages” in advance9. That is, the political feasibility of the 
appointment, party loyalty is also taken into account in resolving personnel issues.
Concluding the review of the German experience, it should be generalized that 
the legal mechanism of control over judges in this country is characterized not only by 
differentiation of the division of supervisory powers at the federal and regional levels, 
but also by active involvement of executive and legislative bodies. At the same time, 
the procedure of qualification training, internship, examinations of persons who can 
apply for judicial positions in the future is of scientific interest.
The experience of the Republic of Poland deserves special attention within 
the framework of the presented issues, because nowadays this country is one of 
the most successful and most developed post-communist states. In Poland, as in 
most democracies, power is exercised on the principles of its division into legislative 
(parliament), executive (government) and judicial. Judicial power is exercised by free 
and independent courts (Supreme Court, courts of general jurisdiction, administra-
tive courts, military courts), as well as by tribunals (the Constitutional Tribunal is the 
equivalent of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court and the State Tribunal). This is stated 
in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland in the article “The power of courts and 
tribunals is separate and independent from other authorities”10.
8 Deutscher Bundestag. basic law for the federal rePublic of germany. (2019). [Elec-
tronic resource]. Available at: https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf/
9 Volker Wagener. how are german judges selected: do the best always win? (2017). 
[Electronic resource]. Available at: https://p.dw.com/p/2hJGP/
10 O. V. Kuzmenko, I. D. Pastukh, O. E. Korystin, et al. administrative law of foreign 
countries: a course of lectures. Jurinkom Inter. (2014).
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The Polish justice system has been restructured since 2015. As part of the 
judicial reform, laws were passed to reorganize the Supreme Court and the National 
Council of Justice. The Minister of Justice has been empowered to appoint and initi-
ate the resignation of Supreme Court judges who have been allowed by law to retire 
early. The provisions on the retirement age of judges were abolished in 2018. Polish 
judicial reform was criticized in the European Union. In November 2019, the European 
Court of Justice in Luxembourg ruled that the Polish law of 2017 on the resignation of 
judges and prosecutors violates eu rules, as it may allow the Polish Minister of Justice 
to dismiss judges arbitrarily11: “The new proposals of the pro-government party of 
Poland to reform the country’s judicial system are in fact a ‘liquidation of the judicial 
system’, and it will lead to the country’s exit from the eu in the future”. This is declared 
in a statement of the Head of the Supreme Court of Poland, Malgorzata Gersdorf, 
regarding the registration a few days ago, by politicians of the right-wing conservative 
party Law and Justice (PiS), of the new draft law on the structure of courts and the 
Supreme Court of the country.
Through the momentum of the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia, which was passed in 2001, Indonesia has officially adopted a 
dualistic judicial review system. Under such system, the authority to conduct judicial 
review is divided/spread to the two judicial organs, each with its own scope of review; 
namely, the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) reviews regulations below the level of 
Law (Undangundang), while the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) reviews 
the same against the Constitution (constitutional review). 
Seen from the theoretical and practical perspective adhered to by states that 
adopt the formation of the Constitutional Court (centered judicial review model), the 
system adopted by Indonesia is uncommon, and moreover it could be considered 
as an error in designing the judicial review system. This is in view of the fact that in 
states which have a Constitutional Court, the authority to conduct judicial review is 
concentrated/centered upon the Constitutional Court. Such division of authority under 
the two-review regime (legal review and constitutional review), as the one practiced by 
Indonesia, is not known (except for South Korea) neither in states that use the central-
ized judicial review model nor in those that use the distribution judicial review model. 
Such distribution is bound to disrupt the judicial review itself, as the authority to 
review is implemented by two different institutions with different review standards. In 
his research, Hamid Chalid puts forward the proposition to centralize the authority to 
11 O. Pavliuk. the euroPean commission will aPPly to the court of justice of the eu 
through judicial reform in Poland. [Electronic resource]. Available at: https://hro-
madske.ua/posts/yevrokomisiya-zvernetsya-do-sudu-yes-z-privodu-sudovoyi-re-
formi- v-polshi
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conduct judicial review in the Constitutional Court, thus putting an end to the practice 
of dualistic judicial review which has been proven to be problematic, and ensuring 
that the judicial review system in Indonesia can be reconstructed and placed upon the 
correct theoretical and practical basis12.
4. Conclusions
Concluding the presented research, it should be generalized that the existing foreign 
experience of control and supervision over the work of judges is quite diverse and 
can be used by domestic legislators when introducing amendments and additions 
to current legislation. However, it should not be completely copied. It will be more 
feasible and effective to adapt the positive aspects of foreign legislation to Ukrainian 
legal realities.
Therefore, the most positive experience that can be used in Ukraine includes:
a) Improving the procedure for selecting judges. This problem is mainly 
solved by: High level of initial training of future judges, high qualification 
requirements for candidates for judges, development of effective mecha-
nisms for checking candidates for judges and selection of candidates for 
these positions, periodic training of judges, improving their qualifications, 
etc. In some foreign countries, special attention is paid to the psychological 
examination of a candidate for the position of a judge;
b) It is necessary to extend the statute of limitations for committing an offen-
se as a basis for disciplinary liability in order to reduce the risk of judges 
avoiding its occurrence;
c) Introduction of new forms and methods of control in the relevant field;
d) To improve the organizational and legal framework for public involvement 
into the implementation of control and supervision measures in the re-
search area.
Of course, the elements we have identified are quite diverse, in fact, they detail 
the specifics of the implementation of existing administrative procedures, forms of 
control, or offer fundamentally new variations. Accordingly, they can be implemented 
in the short-, medium- or long-term perspective, including in combination with further 
12 Hamid Chalid. Dualism of judicial review in Indonesia: Problems and solutions. 
indonesia law review 3. 2017. Pg. 367-394, 367.
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reform, improvement of the overall legal mechanism for regulating the legal status of 
courts and judges in Ukraine.
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